Canada’s Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 184(2)(a) sets a uniform national floor: any participant in a private conversation may record it without committing a criminal offence. Four provinces add statutory civil-liability layers on top of that floor, and Quebec overlays a distinct Civil Code regime. Legality under the Criminal Code and civil exposure under provincial law are separate questions that do not always reach the same answer.
What are recording consent laws and how do they vary by province in Canada
Recording consent laws govern when a person may lawfully record a private communication without all participants agreeing. Under Part VI of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, audio recording is only a criminal offence when done by someone who is not a party to the conversation and has no consent from any participant. A participant who records their own conversation commits no Criminal Code offence anywhere in Canada.
Provincial variation enters through two separate mechanisms. The first is statutory privacy torts in BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador, which create civil causes of action for surveillance including recording — actionable without proof of actual damage. The second is Quebec’s distinct civil-law regime under Civil Code of Québec arts. 35–36, which protects the right to respect of reputation and privacy independently of the federal criminal framework.
For the broader surveillance law context across provinces, including GPS tracking and video obligations, surveillance laws by province covers the overlapping regulatory layers in more detail. For federal recording law specifically, the one-party consent recording in Canada post covers the full Part VI framework.
What the Criminal Code s 184 and s 184.2 set as the national baseline
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Section 184(1): the prohibition. Knowingly intercepting a private communication using any electromagnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device is an indictable offence punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. This applies uniformly across every province and territory. (Department of Justice Canada)
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Section 184(2)(a): the participant exception. Interception is not an offence when the person intercepting has the express or implied consent of either the originator of the communication or the person the originator intended to receive it. This is the one-party consent rule: any participant may record. No province requires all-party (two-party) consent as a matter of criminal law.
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Section 183: the “private communication” definition. A communication qualifies as “private” only when made “under circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it.” A conversation audible across a crowded lobby may fall outside this definition entirely. (Department of Justice Canada)
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Section 184.2: law enforcement interception with consent. Added in 1993 and last amended in 2014, this provision allows a peace officer to seek ex parte judicial authorization to intercept when one party consents. Applications require reasonable grounds to believe an offence occurred or will occur, identification of the consenting party, and a showing that interception will yield relevant information. Authorizations run up to 60 days. This is a state-actor tool requiring prior judicial approval; it is distinct from the private individual’s s. 184(2)(a) right.
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Section 193: the disclosure prohibition. Even a recording made lawfully under s. 184(2)(a) can attract criminal exposure if disclosed outside the listed exceptions. Knowingly using, disclosing, or revealing the existence of a private communication is an offence punishable by up to two years on indictment. Exceptions include disclosure in legal proceedings and to peace officers. Sharing a covert recording online or with third parties sits outside those exceptions.
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The federal sibling post. Constitutional depth on s. 184, including R. v. Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), s. 183.1, and the full Charter analysis, is covered in the one-party consent recording in Canada post. This section is a concise anchor to the federal floor; that sibling owns the deep-dive.
Province-by-province recording rules: audio, video, consumer and workplace
| Province | Audio (one-party) rule | Video / voyeurism (s. 162) | Statutory privacy tort / civil overlay | Consumer and workplace regime |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| British Columbia | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). No provincial criminal overlay. | Criminal Code s. 162 applies uniformly. | BC Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373, s 1(1): statutory tort “actionable without proof of damage” for wilful, unjustified privacy violations. S. 1(4) covers eavesdropping or surveillance whether or not by trespass. Statutory defences in s. 2 include consent, lawful authority, and peace-officer authorization. | BC PIPA, SBC 2003, c 63 displaces PIPEDA for intra-provincial commercial activity (since 2004). S. 13 permits collection of employee personal information without consent when reasonable for managing the employment relationship, with advance notice required. |
| Alberta | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). No provincial statutory privacy tort covering individuals. | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | No BC/SK/MB/NL-equivalent statutory privacy tort. Common law only. | Alberta PIPA, SA 2003, c P-6.5 displaces PIPEDA for intra-provincial commercial activity (since 2004). S. 14 permits employer collection of employee personal information when reasonably required for managing the employment relationship; OIPC Alberta has held covert audio recording of employees requires advance notice. |
| Saskatchewan | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24, s 2: statutory tort “actionable without proof of damage.” S. 3 makes listening to or recording a conversation without consent prima facie evidence of a privacy violation. | No substantially-similar private-sector privacy statute. PIPEDA governs commercial activity. |
| Manitoba | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | Privacy Act, CCSM c P125, ss 2–3: statutory tort for substantial, unreasonable, unjustified privacy violations, actionable without proof of damage. S. 3 expressly covers auditory or visual surveillance including listening to or recording a conversation without consent. | No substantially-similar private-sector privacy statute. PIPEDA governs. |
| Ontario | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). No provincial statutory privacy tort. | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | Common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion recognized by Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32: requires intentional intrusion on seclusion highly offensive to a reasonable person. Narrower than western/Atlantic statutory torts; not routinely applied to participant recording. | No substantially-similar private-sector privacy statute; PIPEDA governs. Employers with 25+ employees must maintain a written electronic monitoring policy under Ontario’s Employment Standards Act, 2000, Part XI.1 (effective 2022). |
| Quebec | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a) as the criminal floor. | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. Additionally, Civil Code of Québec art. 36 enumerates acts constituting invasions of privacy. | Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, arts 35–36: free-standing civil right to privacy; using a recording in a way that violates the other party’s reasonable expectation can ground civil liability. Art. 2858 gives courts discretion to exclude evidence obtained in violation of fundamental rights. | CQLR c P-39.1 (Law 25, in force September 22, 2023) displaces PIPEDA; requires Privacy Officer, privacy impact assessments, and strengthened consent requirements for recording. |
| Newfoundland and Labrador | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22, ss 3–6: statutory tort actionable without proof of damage; s. 4 covers surveillance including eavesdropping, watching, and recording of conversations. Remedies under s. 6 include damages, injunctions, and return of materials. | No substantially-similar private-sector privacy statute. PIPEDA governs. |
| PEI / Nova Scotia / New Brunswick | One-party consent under s. 184(2)(a). None of these three provinces has a statutory privacy tort. | Criminal Code s. 162 applies. | No statutory privacy tort. Common law intrusion upon seclusion (from Ontario’s Jones v. Tsige) has not been definitively adopted by appellate courts in these provinces. | No substantially-similar private-sector privacy statute. PIPEDA governs commercial activity. |
Sources: OPC substantially-similar determinations 2024; provincial statutes cited inline throughout.
Quebec: where the Civil Code adds a layer above the Criminal Code
Quebec’s Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991 creates a free-standing civil right to privacy that operates alongside, and independently of, the federal criminal framework. Article 35 provides: “Every person has a right to the respect of his reputation and privacy. No one may invade the privacy of a person without the consent of the person unless authorized by law.” Article 36 enumerates acts that may, “in particular,” constitute invasions of privacy, including using a person’s name, image, likeness, or voice for a purpose other than the legitimate information of the public.
Quebec courts have consistently held that a participant may record their own conversation without committing a Criminal Code offence. The separate question is whether the use to which that recording is put triggers civil liability under arts. 35–36. That turns on whether the other party had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. The Civil Code analysis is distinct from the criminal-law analysis and can reach a different conclusion.
Article 2858 of the Civil Code of Québec governs admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of fundamental rights. A court shall, even of its own initiative, reject evidence obtained in circumstances that breach fundamental rights and freedoms where the use of that evidence could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In the recording context, Quebec courts apply a two-part test: whether a fundamental right such as art. 35 privacy was violated, and whether admitting the evidence would discredit the administration of justice. A recording made by a participant in a conversation may survive this test depending on context — but the balancing is stricter than in other provinces.
Quebec’s Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (CQLR c P-39.1), substantially overhauled by Law 25 (SQ 2021, c 25), displaces PIPEDA for provincially regulated private-sector organizations. The majority of Law 25’s amendments came into force on September 22, 2023. Key changes include mandatory appointment of a Privacy Officer, mandatory privacy impact assessments, and strengthened consent requirements for collection of personal information. In the recording context, private-sector organizations recording phone calls or audio interactions in Quebec must have a lawful purpose and provide appropriate notice. The individual one-party consent right under s. 184(2)(a) is unaffected — but organizational use of recordings is regulated under P-39.1.
R. v. Jarvis 2019 SCC 10 and the reasonable expectation of privacy test
In R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously affirmed that the reasonable expectation of privacy test for the voyeurism offence under s. 162 of the Criminal Code requires a contextual analysis of the entire circumstances. The Court held that being in a public or semi-public space does not automatically negate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The offence is committed where a person surreptitiously records another person in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if done for a sexual purpose or where the person is nude or engaged in explicit sexual activity.
The case arose from a high school teacher who secretly recorded female students with a camera concealed in a pen. The students were in classrooms and school hallways, semi-public spaces. The Court convicted and held that the students retained a reasonable expectation not to be surreptitiously filmed for a sexual purpose despite their visible location.
Jarvis is the governing standard for video recording across all provinces. It applies to both criminal voyeurism analysis under s. 162 and civil privacy tort analysis in the four statutory-tort provinces, where the same surreptitious-recording conduct can simultaneously engage criminal and civil liability. The operative question in every province is contextual integrity: does this type of recording match what the recorded person reasonably expected in this setting?
R. v. Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30 established the constitutional bedrock for Part VI of the Criminal Code. The Court held that surreptitious electronic surveillance by a state agent constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, even when one party to the conversation has consented, unless conducted under prior judicial authorization. Participant consent alone does not license state surveillance. Duarte and Jarvis together anchor the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis that applies across both audio and video recording contexts.
Workplace recording across provinces: employees, employers, and the evidence problem
Under the Criminal Code’s one-party consent rule, an employee who participates in a workplace conversation may record it without committing a criminal offence in every Canadian province. Technical legality does not protect the employee from workplace discipline.
In Shalagin v. Mercer Celgar Limited Partnership, 2023 BCCA 373, the BC Court of Appeal affirmed that an employee who had covertly recorded over 100 meetings with supervisors and colleagues across ten years had committed misconduct sufficient to constitute just cause for dismissal. The Court held the recordings “undermined the essential trust” in the employer-employee relationship and violated the privacy interests of co-workers. The participant’s s. 184(2)(a) right was not disputed. The employment relationship imposed a separate trust obligation that the recording conduct breached.
Ontario took a different path. The Employment Standards Act, 2000, Part XI.1, added by the Working for Workers Act, 2022 (SO 2022, c 7, effective April 11, 2022), requires every employer with 25 or more employees to maintain a written policy on electronic monitoring of employees. The policy must describe whether monitoring occurs, how and in what circumstances, and the purposes for which collected information may be used. Crucially, the legislation does not create a right not to be monitored and does not limit employer use of the information collected. Ontario is the first Canadian province to impose a mandatory written electronic monitoring disclosure obligation on private-sector employers.
In provinces governed by BC PIPA, SBC 2003, c 63, s 13 and Alberta PIPA, employers seeking to audio-record employees must satisfy the “reasonable for purposes” standard and provide advance notice. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s 2022 guidance found that continuous audio-visual recording of employees in vehicles created a disproportionate loss of privacy relative to the legitimate business purpose, reflecting the proportionality principle that BC and Alberta Privacy Commissioners also apply.
Courts across Canada have consistently held that secretly recorded workplace audio may be admissible as evidence when the recorder was a participant, satisfying s. 184(2)(a). Admissibility does not guarantee weight. In BC, courts are more likely to scrutinize covertly obtained recordings for their effect on the administration of justice. In Quebec, the Civil Code art. 2858 balancing test requires weighing the seriousness of any privacy breach against the importance of the evidence. In Ontario, Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 recognized the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which may in some circumstances ground a civil counter-claim against a person who records with intent to embarrass rather than to preserve evidence.
When a recording crosses from lawful to criminal: the key threshold tests
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The participant test. Recording is lawful only when the person making it is a participant — either the originator of the communication or the intended recipient under s. 183 of the Criminal Code. A third party who plants a recording device to capture a conversation between others has no s. 184(2)(a) defence and faces up to five years’ imprisonment under s. 184(1). The exception is narrow: a family member or friend who is not personally on the call does not qualify even if the recording is made at the direct request of a participant.
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The “private communication” test. A communication only attracts Criminal Code protection if it was made under circumstances where the originator reasonably expected not to be intercepted by anyone other than the intended recipient — the s. 183 definition. Courts apply an objective standard. A closed-door office conversation carries a strong privacy expectation; a conversation audible across a restaurant lobby may not qualify at all. When a communication does not meet the s. 183 definition of “private communication,” intercepting it does not violate s. 184 regardless of consent.
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The voyeurism test for video. Section 162 of the Criminal Code, read through R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, applies a contextual reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis to video recording. Recording someone undressing in a private change room, or capturing a person in a way that invades a private context even in a semi-public space, can constitute voyeurism without any trespass. The question is whether the recording occurred in circumstances where a reasonable person would not expect to be the subject of that type of observation.
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The disclosure test. Section 193 of the Criminal Code creates separate criminal exposure for disclosure of a lawfully obtained recording. Even if a recording was made legally under s. 184(2)(a), knowingly using, disclosing, or revealing the existence of that private communication may be an offence — unless the disclosure is in legal proceedings, to peace officers, or within another listed exception. Posting a covert recording online sits outside those exceptions in every province.
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The provincial civil-liability test. In BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador, a participant recorder can be sued civilly under the applicable statutory privacy tort even where no criminal offence occurred. In Quebec, the Civil Code arts. 35–36 regime adds civil exposure and the art. 2858 admissibility hurdle. In Ontario, the Jones v. Tsige intrusion-upon-seclusion tort is a live but narrower risk.
What these recording rules mean if you are considering covert recording
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The criminal baseline is uniform. Under s. 184(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, you may record any conversation in which you personally participate, in every province, without committing a criminal offence. Making the recording itself does not violate Part VI.
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Civil exposure varies by province. In BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador, the other party may have a civil cause of action against you under the provincial statutory privacy tort regardless of your criminal-law compliance. In Quebec, Civil Code arts. 35–36 create additional civil exposure and a stricter court-level admissibility test under art. 2858. In Ontario, the common law intrusion-upon-seclusion tort is a narrower but live risk if recording is done with intent to embarrass or exploit rather than to preserve evidence.
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Workplace recordings carry employment consequences. Shalagin v. Mercer Celgar (2023 BCCA 373) is the leading case: 100+ covert recordings over ten years established just cause for dismissal. The Criminal Code participant right and the employment relationship impose separate obligations that can diverge.
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Disclosure of the recording is a second distinct risk. s. 193 makes unauthorized publication or third-party sharing of even a lawfully obtained recording a criminal offence. Planning to use a recording in legal proceedings falls within the exception; sharing it on social media does not.
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Proposed federal amendments. Proposed federal amendments to the Criminal Code, currently before Parliament as of June 2026 and not yet enacted, would affect law enforcement access to digital communications. The existing Criminal Code framework (ss. 183, 184, 184.2, and 193) remains the operative federal law governing recording consent across all provinces until any such amendments receive Royal Assent.
As licensed PIs, we work across this matrix on every engagement that involves recorded evidence. The single most common misconception we see is clients assuming that one-party consent makes a recording unconditionally safe to use. It makes the recording lawful to make. That is not the same as lawful to publish, immune from civil suit in the statutory-tort provinces, or automatically admissible in Quebec. Clients who need professional surveillance investigation services for evidence-gathering should discuss the jurisdiction-specific rules before the recording is made, not after. For a broader view of the legal pillar this post sits within, the legal research hub maps the full range of PI-relevant legal explainers.
This article provides general legal information, not legal advice. Canadian law varies by jurisdiction and changes over time. For advice specific to your situation, consult a lawyer licensed to practise in your province.
Frequently asked questions
Is Canada a one-party or two-party consent country for recording?
Is it legal to record a phone call without consent in Canada?
What is the penalty for recording someone without permission in Canada?
Can you record a conversation at work without telling your employer in Canada?
Is Quebec a one-party consent province for recording?
Can a secret recording be used as evidence in a Canadian court?
Sources
- Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 184 — Department of Justice Canada
- Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 183 — Department of Justice Canada
- Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 184.2 — Department of Justice Canada
- Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 193 — Department of Justice Canada
- Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 162 — Department of Justice Canada
- Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 — BC Laws
- Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 (BC PIPA) — BC Laws
- The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan) — CanLII
- The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125 (Manitoba) — CanLII
- Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador) — CanLII
- Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, arts 35–36, 2858 — LégisQuébec
- An Act to modernize legislative provisions as regards the protection of personal information, SQ 2021, c 25 (Law 25) — CanLII
- Provincial laws that may apply instead of PIPEDA — Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (2024)
- R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 — CanLII
- R. v. Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 30 — CanLII
- Shalagin v. Mercer Celgar Limited Partnership, 2023 BCCA 373 — CanLII
- Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 — CanLII
- Your guide to the Employment Standards Act — Electronic monitoring of employees — Government of Ontario (2022)
- Privacy in the Workplace — OPC Guidance on Employee Monitoring (2022)
- Bill C-22 (Lawful Access Act, 2026) — Parliament of Canada LEGISinfo
This article provides general legal information, not legal advice. Canadian law varies by jurisdiction and changes over time. For advice specific to your situation, consult a lawyer licensed to practise in your province.